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The United Kingdom has recently enacted smoking bans in public places such as 
restaurants and pubs. Public health advocates argue that bans are necessary 
because non-smokers need protection from second-hand smoke. Advocates also claim 
that bans do not exert harm on owners because of a vast empirical literature 
showing that restaurants and bars in the United States never suffer harm following 
bans. This paper examines whether these claims are true by developing a model 
within the Coasian framework whereby owners of businesses have incentives to deal 
with smoking disputes between smokers and non-smokers. Our model demonstrates 
that it is incorrect to argue that smoking bans are necessary because the private 
market has no method of attempting to solve smoking problems. It also predicts that 
bans exert different effects on different businesses: some will be unaffected while 
others will experience losses or gains. Our literature review reveals that predictions of 
differential effects are consistent with the empirical evidence. 
Introduction who do not wish to be exposed to passive 
smoking could choose to work in other 
Public health advocates argue that bans are establishments. The issue would be different, 
necessary because non-smokers need just as it would be for issues of racial and 
protection from second-hand smoke. The sexual equality, if the employers were 
United Kingdom recently enacted smoking monopsonistic purchasers of labour but this is 
bans in public places such as restaurants and emphatically not the case here. 
pubs (Scotland, 26 March 2006; Wales, We develop our model within the Coasian 
2 April 2007; Northern Ireland, 30 April 2007; framework whereby owners of businesses have 
and England, 1 July 2007), where a major incentives to deal with smoking disputes 
concern was for the health of employees in between smokers and non-smokers. This 
such establishments. Advocates also claim model has two important predictions. One, 
that such bans do not harm business owners owners attempt to deal with smoking disputes 
because of a vast empirical literature showing prior to the enactment of bans and therefore it 
that restaurants and bars in the United States is incorrect to argue that bans are necessary 
never suffer harm following bans (Glantz, because the private market has no method of 
2007). In fact, advocates often claim that bans attempting to solve smoking problems. Two, 
improve sales at restaurants and bars and so, smoking bans are expected to exert different 
in effect, owners should thank them for effects on different businesses so that it is 
promoting bans. inappropriate to estimate aggregate effects of 
This paper focuses on whether smoking bans on businesses. Some businesses will be 
bans harm owners of restaurants, pubs, social unaffected while others will experience losses 
and tombola clubs in the hospitality industry. or gains. We argue that studies showing no 
We do not dwell on the issue of protecting harm are not as unbiased or scientiﬁc as 
employees from possible ill-health effects from many researchers claim. We also raise the 
passive smoking for two reasons. First, issue of whether claims of harm from 
smoking itself is legal and if government was second-hand smoke in restaurants and bars 
serious about ‘health and safety’ it would act are based on sound evidence because this 
on the primary source of the problem. Second, argument is often an important reason given 
in competitive labour markets, characteristic by ban advocates for government 
of those in the hospitality industry, workers intervention. 
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The Coase theorem and smoking bans 
Private markets are argued to fail when externalities are 
present because resource allocation takes place without full 
consideration of all costs and beneﬁts. For example, a negative 
externality arises when Roger, who smokes, does not 
compensate Elaine, a non-smoker, when they sit near each 
other in a restaurant. The conventional viewpoint, or what is 
commonly referred to as the Pigouvian approach, simply 
singles out Roger as the source of the externality thus leading to 
the conventional solution that Roger needs to be taxed or 
regulated. A ban on smoking is one such regulation. Ronald 
Coase (1960), however, introduced the notion of the ‘reciprocal 
nature of externalities’ whereby both parties involved believe 
that the other is the source of the problem. Roger does not like 
Elaine complaining about his smoking and Elaine does not 
enjoy smoking by Roger. This key insight is critical to 
understanding that both Roger and Elaine have incentives to 
deal with each other over their dispute since Roger enjoys 
smoking and Elaine does not want to inhale any of Roger’s 
smoke. A private market therefore attempts to resolve 
externality problems. Coase argued that, in the absence of 
transactions costs, negotiation achieves an efﬁcient solution 
as long as resources are privately owned and transferable. 
At ﬁrst glance, it appears there are no means to settle 
putative conﬂicts between Roger and Elaine since the Coase 
theorem demonstrates that an efﬁcient solution requires both 
low transactions costs between disputers and well-deﬁned 
property rights to scarce resources. In fact, it is commonplace 
for ban advocates to argue that transactions costs are so 
prohibitive that we can simply quit all further efforts at 
applying the Coase theorem to smoking in restaurants or bars. 
An early dismissal is contained in a health economics textbook 
(Phelps, 1992, p. 430), that states: 
‘Trying to use agreements . . . between people in a restaurant to 
determine whether smoking would take place would be the height of 
absurdity, and nobody would think seriously of a full “property rights” 
approach to such a problem. The transactions costs of reaching 
agreements would overwhelm the problem.’ 
End of discussion, since bans must be the only solution. 
So are transactions costs so prohibitive? Clearly, it is 
unreasonable to expect smokers and non-smokers to 
continually engage in negotiation with one another over use of 
air spaces. But, we must remember that neither of these two 
users of airspace are its owners. The owner of a restaurant or 
bar owns the airspace and, as such, has strong ﬁnancial 
incentives to allocate this scarce resource efﬁciently. Owners, in 
effect, mediate between two demanders – smokers and non­
smokers – over how much smoking to allow within their 
establishments. Owners allocate air spaces to highest-valued 
users. In some cases, they may voluntarily forbid all smoking 
when many of their customers prefer no smoking. Other cases 
will arise where owners ‘accommodate’ diverse smoking 
preferences by offering separate rooms, smoking/non-smoking 
sections, and improving air ﬁltration systems. 
The Coase theorem is represented diagrammatically in 
Figure 1. DrDr′ represents the diminishing marginal value for 
Roger of each additional cigarette he smokes. CeCe′ shows the 
Figure 1: Property rights and bargaining limits 
rising marginal discomfort to Elaine of each additional 
cigarette smoked by Roger. It is clear that the optimal number 
of cigarettes smoked is 0q. If the property right to the airspace 
lies with Roger, he would be willing to accept value d and 
Elaine would be willing to pay up to value d + b for Roger to 
reduce smoking from 0n to 0q cigarettes. If the property right 
lies with Elaine, she would be willing to accept c and Roger 
would be willing to pay up to c + a to be allowed to increase 
smoking from zero up to 0q cigarettes. Only if Elaine’s 
discomfort schedule intersected the left vertical axis above Dr
would the outcome be the same as a ban. 
As long as owners desire maximum proﬁt, own their 
airspace and mediate conﬂicts between smokers and 
non-smokers, it is reasonable to expect that private markets are 
paying attention to the smoking preferences of their customers 
and there is no reason to predict that all owners allocate 
resources in identical ways. In other words, claims by ban 
advocates that private owners can never deal with the smoking 
issue are clearly wrong. 
One of us (Marlow) has published ﬁve peer-reviewed 
articles demonstrating the depth of private markets in 
accommodation. A brief summary of their ﬁndings has been 
provided below:1 
•	 Owners offer more non-smoking seating, better ventilation 
and other accommodations when servicing fewer smoking 
customers. 
•	 Some owners voluntarily ban all smoking, but others allow 
smoking throughout or dedicate areas where smoking is 
not allowed. 
•	 The probability that a jurisdiction has a ban is positively 
related to the non-smoking share of the population, so 
bans are endogenous and tend to be enacted ‘after the fact’ 
in that private markets have already been re-allocating 
resources from smokers towards non-smokers. 
The available research does not prove that private markets 
fully internalise all smoking problems. This issue, however, can 
best be studied with data on how private markets deal with 
smoking. The evidence does reveal a private market where 
owners allocate resources in directions consistent with 
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economic theory and therefore predicts that, as smokers 
dwindle in numbers, smokers will continue to lose ground to 
non-smokers in their ﬁght for airspaces within businesses. 
An important implication of this private market in 
accommodation is that bans will exert different effects on 
different businesses. These same studies ﬁnd evidence of the 
following effects: 
•	 Owners with more smoking customers predict losses more 
often than those with few smoking customers. 
•	 Owners adjust prices, wages, hours of operation and other 
business attributes in response to bans and so bans also 
affect customers and workers. 
•	 Smoking bans are not fully enforced, and it is predictable 
that compliance is inversely related to the degree of harm 
imposed on owners. 
•	 Bars, social and tombola clubs experience more harm than 
restaurants because they cater more to social interactions 
between smoking and non-smoking patrons. 
•	 Bans are mostly adopted in jurisdictions with fewer smokers,
so jurisdictions that ban smoking experience less harm 
than if bans were forced on jurisdictions with more smokers. 
So, empirical evidence exists that smoking bans will affect 
different businesses differently and there is little logic to claims 
that all businesses will either suffer no harm or may even gain. 
The market process evolves over time and it is undoubtedly 
true that owners expend greater accommodation efforts now 
than in the past, simply because they pursue maximum proﬁts 
in an environment where non-smokers are gaining ground on 
smokers over use of airspaces. Those who are impatient or 
intolerant of smokers, and whose ideological sensibilities lead 
them to discount the ability of private markets to resolve 
smoking disputes, are predisposed to concluding that bans are 
necessary. 
Recent evidence of the effects of bans in Scotland reaches 
similar conclusions. Adda et al. (2007) estimated the short-run 
economic impacts of the Scottish smoking ban on public 
houses. They compared the sales and number of customers in 
public houses located in Scotland before and after the Scottish 
smoking ban was introduced, relative to a control group of 
establishments across the English border where no ban was 
imposed. They collected data on 2,724 pubs (1,590 in Scotland 
and 1,134 in Northern England) by phone interviews using 
quota sampling. They found that the Scottish ban led to a 
10% decrease in sales and a 14% decrease in customers. 
A recent news story discusses how one German bar owner 
dealt with a ban on smoking by cutting holes in his walls so 
that customers could literally stick their heads out to smoke 
cigarettes.2 Each smoker was provided three holes, one each for 
their head and their two hands. Smoking customers were then 
free to stick their heads and hands out to enjoy their cigarettes. 
The owner also mounted a curtain to protect smoking 
customers from the cold. Following the implementation of the 
ban in England there was a very marked increase in the sales 
and constructions of gazebos thus providing attractive 
sheltered smoking areas with patio heaters in beer gardens. 
The following letter appeared in the Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2007: 
‘Sir – Overheard at the bar of my local [pub] as I ordered a pint: “Well, 

I can stay here and be bored or go outside for some passive smoking and 

a chat.” We left together to join the crowd in the smoking shed, leaving 
the bar empty.’ 
We add these stories to make two points. First, the fact that an 
owner ﬁnds it necessary to accommodate smoking customers 
in this manner strongly suggests that full enforcement of the 
ban would lower proﬁts. Second, costs associated with this 
circumvention of the ban should not be ignored when we 
examine beneﬁts and costs of bans. 
Equity and cigarette bans 
It is well known that smoking is disproportionately associated 
with lower socio-income groups. Smoking bans therefore 
adversely affect the working classes more than the better-off. 
We have also seen that non-smokers, mainly the middle 
classes, are the ones leading the drive towards smoke-free laws 
in the UK. It is also interesting to note, in the Coasian context, 
how pub chain giant, Wetherspoons, voluntarily introduced a 
no-music ban and then a smoking ban which was in place two 
years before legislation became law. Whilst popular attention 
has focused on restaurants and pubs, the ban will have a big 
impact on the two types of institutions which are especially 
associated with the working classes: the Working Men’s Club 
and Institute Union (CIU, founded in 1862) and Bingo 
(tombola) Clubs. Most CIU clubs are historically associated 
with the working man who likes to drink and smoke (in many 
cases without any women in the bar). The CIU clubs are more 
than just drinking holes; they provide social meeting places for 
the community. It has been estimated that one in ﬁve working 
men’s clubs in England and Wales fear they will be forced to 
close as a result of the smoking ban and that 83% would see 
takings fall. On the other hand, bingo clubs are mainly 
patronised by working-class smoking women. Mecca, one of 
the largest operators of bingo halls, estimates half of its patrons 
are smokers. Like the CIU clubs, bingo halls are social meeting 
places for low-income women where they can gossip and 
interact with friends whilst having the chance of leaving with 
windfall winnings. It is easily forgotten that the smoking 
culture is a socialising activity. It is perhaps not a coincidence 
that when smoking was at its peak in the middle of the last 
century, when about 75% of the adult population smoked, that 
social cohesion was also at its strongest. 
How do ban advocates show that bans exert 
no harm?3 
A fairly large empirical literature reports that bans exert no 
adverse effects on owners. Some studies even advance 
arguments that bans raise proﬁts so much that owners should, 
in effect, thank ban advocates for raising their wealth. A recent 
literature review states 
‘. . . the vast majority of studies ﬁnd that there is no negative economic 
impact of clean indoor air policies, with many ﬁndings that there may be 
some positive effects on local businesses.’ 
(Eriksen and Chaloupka, 2007, p. 375) 
We now examine how these economic studies arrive at these 
conclusions. 
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As discussed, economic theory predicts that bans exert 
differential effects on businesses, thus leading to the research 
question: how many ﬁrms gain, lose or are unaffected? This is not 
the question examined by researchers claiming that bans exert 
no harm. Most studies employ a ‘community effects’ 
methodology that aggregates all businesses into one number 
and then examines whether this aggregate changes following a 
ban. The examination becomes: do aggregate sales or tax revenues 
rise, fall or stay the same following a ban? Studies routinely 
conclude that sales and tax revenues never fall, but rise or stay 
the same. 
The ‘community effects’ methodology bypasses the 
interesting question of: how many owners gain, lose or suffer no 
ill effects from bans? This method is like looking at a classroom 
of 30 students, and after observing that average weight is 
160 pounds, concluding that no changes occurred over the 
following ten years because average weight remained 160 
pounds. Meanwhile, some students gained 20 pounds, some 
lost 10 pounds, and still others exhibited no change. This is not 
a meaningful analysis, but nonetheless is employed in most 
studies that conclude that bans harm no business. There could 
be a defence of the ‘community effects’ approach, but we have 
never seen one because these studies never explain what this 
methodology ignores. 
Is ‘scientiﬁc’ research on adverse health 
consequences of second-hand smoke pure? 
We suspect some readers believe we have taken a rather 
cavalier attitude towards the adverse health effects of second­
hand smoke. It must be true that non-smokers are at serious 
risk from second-hand smoke because we have heard this 
warning countless times. However, while we do not argue that 
there is zero health risk, the literature remains somewhat 
unsettled about how great risks are. An extremely thorough 
sceptical review of the risks from environmental tobacco smoke 
can be found in Nilsson’s contribution to What Risk? Science, 
Politics and Public Health (Bate, 1997). It is undoubtedly true 
that environmental tobacco smoke contains carcinogens, 
as does coffee, as any search engine will demonstrate, and 
virtually everything we eat, but the issue is the magnitude of 
the risk. 
Siegel (2007), an epidemiologist and long-time ban 
advocate, discusses what he refers to as the wild claims of many 
ban advocates regarding the adverse health effects of second­
hand smoke and discusses how he has been personally attacked 
for criticising such claims. Siegel argues that anti-tobacco 
activists have been very busy over-estimating adverse health 
effects so that they will ﬁnd little resistance from the public 
over their push for smoking bans. 
‘The general approach has been to attack ad hominem, rather than to 
directly confront the arguments being made. For this reason, I have 
come to the impression that the tobacco control movement does not 
allow room for any difference of opinion, and that those who dissent 
with any aspect of the prevailing wisdom must be discredited, attacked 
and silenced. I sense a rather McCarthyistic element in the tobacco 
control movement. Whether the scientiﬁc arguments I have made are 
valid or not is up for question and debate; the unwillingness of the 
movement to be willing to entertain a discussion of the validity of its 
scientiﬁc claims, on the other hand, is a dangerous element in a public 
health movement.’ 
(Siegel, 2007, p. 20) 
Siegel fears: 
‘The dissemination of inaccurate information by anti-smoking groups to 
the public in support of smoking bans is unfortunate because it may 
harm the tobacco control movement by undermining its credibility, 
reputation, and effectiveness.’ 
(Ibid., p. 24) 
Carl Phillips, an epidemiologist at the University of Alberta, 
has also written about personal and ﬁnancial attacks levelled 
against him because he has also been vocal about what he 
perceives as junk science in the study of ETS (environmental 
tobacco smoke): 
‘There is little doubt that inhaling smoke is unhealthy, but equally clear 
evidence shows that we can only demonstrate disease risk from ETS for 
those at the highest level of exposure. The evidence about health effects 
of smoke and the legitimate aesthetic objection to involuntary ETS 
exposure are quite sufﬁcient to justify prohibiting indoor smoking in 
public places, though clearly insufﬁcient to justify public policies that 
prohibit voluntary low-level ETS gain. The activists involved, many of 
whom hold titles that indicate that they should behave as scientists and 
academics, appear unconcerned about subverting science to further their 
worldly agendas, hurting the careers of honest scientists, driving 
students away from politically controversial ﬁelds, attacking the 
principles of free academic research, and threatening the reputation of 
epidemiology as a ﬁeld.’ 
(Phillips, 2007) 
Risk perception and real risk 
It is well known that the public perception of risk is often at 
variance with the evidence (Slovic et al., 1980). There are three 
types of risk: those that are directly perceptible such as 
accidents from trafﬁc; those that require use of science for 
evaluation such as risks from cholera or inﬂuenza; and those, 
virtual risks, where there is doubt or a lack of knowledge 
among scientists such as the risks from BSE/CJD and 
environmental hazards (Adams, 1997). The risks from ETS 
seem to lie in the virtual category. Responses to virtual risk are 
likely to be inﬂuenced by pressure groups such as health 
campaigners who are likely to argue for prohibitions regardless 
of cost. Liberals, on the other hand, will tend to argue that such 
regulations are an infringement of liberty and should be 
minimised. Policy responses to virtual risks require politicians 
to seek expert advice. Experts, however, because they are 
specialists tend to give a high priority to their own expertise to 
the exclusion of competing specialists with competing interests 
and the broader interest (Craven et al., 1994). Where, as in the 
case of ETS, the medical evidence has generated wide variations 
in estimates of the extent to which individuals are harmed the 
conditions are propitious for interest groups to take the moral 
high ground and advocate draconian action. But even when 
regulations are imposed individuals will take avertive action 
(perhaps by smoking more at home rather than in a social 
setting or even by disobeying the law). When wearing seat belts 
was made compulsory in cars, drivers drove faster so that the 
rate of accidents tended to remain constant. 
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A good example of how easy it is to distort the divergence 
of perception of risk from actual risk is found in the following 
story. In 1997, Nathan Zohner, a 14-year-old schoolboy from 
Idaho, surveyed his classmates about a chemical called 
dihydrogen monoxide. This compound contributes to: the 
‘greenhouse effect’, the erosion of our natural landscape, 
corrosion and rusting of many metals and is found in excised 
tumours of terminal cancer patients. Despite this it is used: as a 
ﬁre retardant, in pesticides, and as an additive of many junk 
foods and other food products. Forty-three of 50 students 
surveyed said the substance should be banned. The substance 
is water. The term ‘Zohnerism’ is used to refer to a true fact 
being used by a scientiﬁcally ignorant public to generate a 
false conclusion. 
Conclusions 
This article has applied the Coase theorem to the case of 
smoking bans and predicts that there is an active private 
market in dealing with smoking issues and that smoking bans 
will exert different economic effects on different types of 
businesses. This application is apparently not popular among 
the many researchers who claim that bans never harm any 
business. We have also shown that the many studies showing 
no harm do not really show this result since their methodology 
ignores effects on individual businesses because they distill all 
effects – positive, negative and neutral – into one number that 
is incapable of demonstrating no harm. 
We ﬁnd it curious that, while most economists would never 
claim that zero air or water pollution is a meaningful goal, they 
argue just this in the case of smoking in restaurants and pubs. 
Arguments for zero smoking must mean no costs are ever 
incurred when owners are forced to clean all smoke in their 
airspace. Losing customers or sales following a ban, or lost 
welfare of smokers, can clearly be considered a cost of clean-up. 
A more informed policy might allow a ﬁnite number of 
smoking ‘licences’ to be auctioned off in jurisdictions whereby 
owners whose businesses beneﬁt the most from smoking can 
retain property rights over their airspace. Ban advocates never 
argue for this policy, but of course entertaining this argument 
also acknowledges that bans might harm some businesses. An 
auction approach also presumes an understanding of Coase’s 
logic concerning importance of private resource ownership as 
well as the ‘reciprocal nature of externalities’. 
We also ﬁnd it curious that ban advocates have taken the 
tactic of showing no harm, when this is clearly nonsense. A 
more appropriate question might be: what level of harm would 
be acceptable for us to ban all smoking in restaurants and pubs?
Harm exerted on 5%, 10% or 20% of businesses, for example? 
Indeed, low levels of harm would likely still attract broad 
support for bans. But ban advocates keep insisting that harm is 
zero. It is as if advocates somehow worry that a candid 
discussion of costs and beneﬁts would somehow derail future 
ban adoptions. This is doubtful given long-standing declines in 
smoking that are likely to persist. Of course, an understanding 
of private markets would predict something similar, but at a 
pace apparently too slow for ban advocates. Moreover, the 
predicted level of harm from bans is likely to diminish over 
time as well, simply because there will probably be fewer 
smokers. 
1.	 See Boyes and Marlow (1996) and Dunham and Marlow (2000a, 2000b, 
2003, 2004). 
2.	 See http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_2655704.html (27 December 
2007). 
3.	 Marlow (2008) provides a detailed discussion of the many problems 
associated with this literature. 
References and bibliography 
Adams, J. (1997) ‘Cars, Cholera, Cows and Contaminated Land: Virtual 
Risk and the Management of Uncertainty’, in R. Bate (ed.) What 
Risk? Science, Politics and Public Health, Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
Adda, J. and F. Cornaglia (2006a) ‘The Effect of Taxes and Bans on 
Passive Smoking’, Discussion Paper No. 509, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, Australian National University, January. 
Adda, J. and F. Cornaglia (2006b) ‘Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and 
Smoking Intensity’, American Economic Review, 96, 1013–1028. 
Adda, J., S. Berlinski and S. Machin (2007) ‘Short-run Economic Effects 
of the Scottish Smoking Ban’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 
36, 149–154. 
Bate, R. (1997) What Risk? Science, Politics and Public Health, Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Boyes, W. J. and M. L. Marlow (1996) ‘The Public Demand for Smoking 
Bans’, Public Choice, 88, 57–67. 
Buddelmeyer, H. and R. Wilkins (2005) ‘The Effects of Smoking Ban 
Regulations on Individual Smoking Rates’, Discussion Paper No. 
1737, University of Melbourne, September. 
Coase, R. H. (1960) ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 3 (October), 1–44. 
Craven, B. M., G. T. Stewart and M. Taghavi (1994) ‘Amateurs 
Confronting Specialists: Expenditure on AIDS in England’, Journal 
of Public Policy, 13, 305–325. 
Dunham, J. and M. L. Marlow (2000a) ‘Smoking Laws and the 
Allocation of Restaurant and Bar Seating’, Economic Inquiry, 38, 
151–157. 
Dunham, J. and M. L. Marlow (2000b) ‘The Differential Effects of 
Smoking Laws on Restaurants, Bars and Taverns’, Contemporary 
Economic Policy, 18, 326–333. 
Dunham, J. and M. L. Marlow (2003) ‘The Economic Incidence of 
Smoking Restrictions’, Applied Economics, 35, 1935–1942. 
Dunham, J. and M. L. Marlow (2004) ‘The Private Market for 
Accommodation’, Eastern Economic Journal, 30, 377–391. 
Eriksen, M. and F. Chaloupka (2007) ‘The Economic Impact of Clean 
Indoor Air Laws’, CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians, 57, 367–378. 
Glantz, S. A. (2007) ‘Commentary: Assessing the Effects of the Scottish 
Smokefree Law – The Placebo Effect and the Importance of 
Obtaining Unbiased Data’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 36, 
155–156. 
Marlow, M. L. (2008) ‘Honestly, Who Else Would Fund Such Research?’, 
Econ Journal Watch, 5, 240–268. 
Orzechowski, W. and R. C. Walker (2006) The Tax Burden on Tobacco: 
Historical Compilation 2005, Arlington, VA: Orzechowski and 
Walker. 
Phelps, C. E. (1992) Health Economics, New York: HarperCollins. 
Phillips, C. V. (2007) ‘Warning: Anti-tobacco Activism May Be 
Hazardous to Epidemiologic Science’, Epidemiologic Perspectives 
and Innovations, 4, 13. 
Scollo, M., A. Lal, A. Hyland and S. Glantz (2003) ‘Review of the Quality 
of Studies on the Economic Effects of Smoke-free Policies on the 
Hospitality Industry’, Tobacco Control, 12, 13–20. 
Siegel, M. (2007) ‘Is the Tobacco Control Movement Misrepresenting 
the Acute Cardiovascular Health Effects of Secondhand Smoke 
Exposure?’, Epidemiologic Perspectives and Innovations, 4, 12. 
Slovic, P., B. Fischoff and S. Lichenstein (1980) ‘Facts and Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk’, in R. C. Schwing and W. A. Albers 
Jr. (eds.) Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough?, New 
York: Plenum Press. 
Thun, M. J., C. A. Lally, J. T. Flannery, E. E. Calle, W. D. Flanders and 
C. W. Heath, Jr. (1997) ‘Cigarette Smoking and Changes in the 
Histopathology of Lung Cancer’, Journal of the National Cancer 
Institute, 89, 1580–1586. 
